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I. INTRODUCTION
The discharge of oil from vessels on the navigable waters of the
United States' causes our environment to suffer and people as well. This
study examines the question of whether those who are damaged by such
discharges can adequately obtain compensation for their injuries.
It is not necessary to review the environmental aspects of oil pollu-
tion or even the development of the maritime oil transportation industry
or the casualty history of that industry.2 This discussion simply requires
that one be cognizant of the consequences that people suffer as a result
* Port Warden, Port of Miami; J.D., University of Kentucky; L.L.M. (Ocean Law),
University of Miami.
1. For the purposes of this study, except where otherwise provided by legislation dis-
cussed herein, the term-(1) "'discharge' includes, but is not limited to any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping;" Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(a)(2) (Supp. 1974); (2) "oil" means oil of any kind in any liquid
form including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, oil mixed with
water, crude oil, and all other liquid hydrocarbons regardless of specific gravity; Coastal
Conveyance of Petroleum Act of 1970, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 542 (Supp. 1973);
(3) "'vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other contrivance used, or capable
of being used, as a means of transportation on water, whether self-propelled or other-
wise . . . ." Id.; (4) "'navigable waters of the United States' shall be construed to mean
those waters of the United States, including the territorial seas adjacent thereto, the general
character of which is navigable, and which, either by themselves or by uniting with other
waters, form a continuous waterway which boats or vessels may navigate or travel between
two or more States, or to or from foreign nations." 33 C.F.R. § 2.10-5 (1973); for a judicial
interpretation of navigability, see The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) and The
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
2. For a discussion of these aspects see Post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sus-
tained by the Discharge of Oil from Vessels on the Navigable Waters of the United States:
A Survey, 4 J. MAarrTME L. & COMMERCE 25 (1972).
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of a vessel's discharge of oil. Basically, these injuries vary in kind and
degree, for oil spills may have wide ranging effects on an entire populace
as well as specific effects on certain individuals and businesses.
The common aggravation of the aesthetic senses provoked by the
sight of oil-coated beaches and waters, both to those people living along
the water's edge and to those traveling to it seeking relaxation or recrea-
tion, is representative of the damage the public bears as a consequence of
oil pollution. Likewise, the destruction of a fishery or other marine in-
dustry as an aftermath to an oil discharge, in addition to causing havoc
within that industry, may affect the public in general through unemploy-
ment and a diminished food or resource supply. While the present rami-
fications of oil pollution may be severe enough, its pervasive effects may
be far more deleterious to the masses in the future, particularly if man
is compelled to rely upon artificial desalinization as a major source of
his domestic and industrial water supply.
A few examples will serve to illustrate the specific injuries that pri-
vate parties may sustain as a result of an oil discharge. Damage may
occur to beaches, to piers, to buildings, to vessels, or to leased or pri-
vately owned submerged land and ponding areas. Spills causing such
damage may give rise to a private claim for cleanup costs as well as for
loss of property value. Private parties may also undergo damage to their
economic interests as a result of oil pollution. For example, those who are
in the business of catering to tourists may suffer not only aesthetic and
property damage, but a loss of profits as well. This is true whether one
is a resort owner whose befouled beaches repel tourists or a gas station
or restaurant owner a few blocks away whose business depends less di-
rectly, but just as heavily, on clean beaches and water. Then too, severe
and prolonged economic damage may befall those whose occupation it
is to harvest marine life if the productivity of the water in their area of
operation is destroyed by an oil spill.
II. A FoRu FoR RELIEF
Unfortunately, in the vast majority of states today, injured persons
have to rely almost exclusively on traditional concepts of tort liability to
recover for the damages they suffer as a result of a vessel's discharge
of oil. In so doing, they are faced with the initial problem of whether to
institute their suits in the federal courts or in the state courts.
The competence of the federal courts to administer maritime law
arises from article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which extends the
judicial power of the United States to "all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction." 4 The scope of this jurisdiction has historically been
rather generally defined as extending to all torts and injuries occurring
3. Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 Dme-v L.J. 400, 404
(1967).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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on the navigable waters of the United States, and to all contracts whose
subject matter is maritime.5 Congress, however, has the power to expand
the scope of that definition within the pervasive limits of the Constitu-
tion's admiralty grant. Congress did this when it passed the Admiralty
Extension Act of 1948, which provides:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to
person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, not-
withstanding that such damage or injury be done or consum-
mated on land.6
Thus, it is apparent that when the discharge of oil from a vessel on
the navigable waters of the United States is a civil wrong, and it results
in damage to other watercraft, to structures on the navigable waters, to
the navigable waters themselves, to structures on land, or to the land
itself, an action will lie for the maritime tort.7
For numerous reasons, which may range from simple inconvenience
to crafty forum shopping, a claimant may not desire to bring his action
in a federal forum. Therefore, he may wish to rely upon the "saving to
suitors clause"' and institute his suit in a state court. Yet, as a general
proposition, if a case is one that arises within admiralty jurisdiction, it
will be governed primarily by a body of substantive federal maritime law,
which may differ radically from state law.' In fact, the existence of this
body of law may preempt state legislation which interferes with the uni-
form working of the federal maritime legal system."0 Thus, uniform
principles of substantive maritime law will be applicable in all private
actions arising out of a discharge on navigable waters of the United
States, regardless of the judicial forum in which they are presented.
Nonetheless, in developing the law of maritime torts, the courts have
utilized the tort law principles developed in the common law of the states.
Therefore, the portals to actions founded upon the traditional common
law concepts of trespass, negligence, and nuisance are open to claimants
seeking relief for damages occasioned by a vessel's discharge of oil on
5. G. GiT oRE & C. BLAcx, Tnx LAW OP ADIrmALTY §§ 1-9 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Grr oRz1.
6. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
7. E.g., Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953)
(damage to other vessels); California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal.
1969) (damage to waters); In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y.
'1958) (damage to land).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) confers on the district courts original and exclusive juris-
diction of cases coming within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors
In all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
9. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co.,
247 U.S. 372 (1918); Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime
Law, 64 HAav. L. REv. 246 (1950); GmwioR, supra note 5, at §§ 1-16 to 18.
10. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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navigable waters." Actions based on these concepts may be initiated in
either the federal courts on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction, or in the
state courts.
III. COMPENSATION BASED ON TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS
OF TORT LIABILITY
A. Trespass
Under ancient common law, every unauthorized, unintended, non-
negligent entry onto the property of another was actionable under the
writ of trespass quare clausum jregit.12 Moreover, every voluntary action
or enterprise that interfered with land in the possession of another im-
posed strict liability upon the wrongdoer.' 3 Where strict liability provided
a foundation for a claimant's action, the "fact" and "physical cause" of
his injury were all that claimant had to establish, along with the amount
of his damage, in order to recover. Regretably, for a number of today's
innocently damaged property owners, under modern tort theory, causing
an object to enter land is actionable as a trespass only where it is the
result of an intentional intrusion, a negligent intrusion, or an intrusion
arising from an abnormally dangerous activity.' 4
Thus, under the prevailing view of trespass, liability can be based
only on fault or participation in an abnormally dangerous activity.'5 Since
the courts have yet to declare that the carriage of oil at sea is an abnor-
mally dangerous activity, the oil pollution claimant will necessarily have
to prove fault if he seeks recovery for damage resulting from an oil dis-
charge on a theory of trespass. Trespass then fails as an effective remedy
for property owners whose land has been invaded by oil resulting from
an unintentional and non-negligent discharge.
However, because past experience has shown that most oil spills
occur because of negligence or intentional action,'" trespass would appear
to be a means for recovering compensation for oil-damaged property.
Nevertheless, due to the problems encountered in establishing intent or
negligence, many pollution claimants may be discouraged from insti-
tuting a trespass action, and those that do may find it expensive and time
consuming.'7
'11. Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARv. INT'L L.J. 316, 347 (1967).
12. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 63 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
13. Id. at 63-64.
14. Except where the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity, an
unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another, or caus-
ing a thing or third person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability
to the possessor, even though the entry causes harm to the possessor to a thing or
third person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.
RESTATEIENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 166 (1965). See also id. §§ 158, 165 for discussion of
intentional intrusions and negligent intrusions respectively.
15. PRossER, supra note 12, at 64-S.
16. Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FoRDAm L. REV. 155 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Sweeney].
17. As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible to prove negligence on the part
19741
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Because one of the elements of trespass is an actual entry or intru-
sion onto property, beachfront owners whose property is not actually
invaded but whose use of adjacent waters may be diminished would
seemingly be precluded from using the trespass theory to recover for their
annoyance and loss of use of the adjacent water. However, if beachfront
owners can show some property interest in these adjacent waters, such
as the right to raise oysters or other marine life under a lease from a state
or under the protection of special state statutes, they may validly claim
relief on the basis of trespass.18 This same entry requirement would also
prevent non-beachfront businessmen from using the trespass theory to
recover for lost business profits due to pollution of neighboring beaches.
Conversely, where an action in trespass lies, recovery may be
awarded not only for property damage, but also for the loss of business
profits resulting from the property damage. Once liability for trespass
is established, the defendant's liability extends to all damages which are
the natural and probable consequence of trespass, without regard to
whether they would otherwise be actionable. 9
B. Negligence
One of the principal theories relied upon to recover damages for the
maritime tort of oil pollution is negligence. Provided that the oil pollu-
tion claimant can show the factual cause of his injury, often an extremely
difficult task in itself, his greatest burden may be proving the existence
of the legal or proximate cause of his damage, particularly if he is a non-
beachfront property owner.20 In fact, it has been suggested that a beach-
of the owners of the tanker. The problem of proving faulty construction of a tanker
built, perhaps, in Japan, Germany, Norway or Greece, or faulty seamanship by a
vessel flying the Liberian or Panamanian flag and carrying a multi-national crew,
is beyond the ability of a property owner whose shoreline is ruined by oil spillage.
Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 359, 366 (1970).
18. In Alabama, for example,
[tihe Director of Conservation is authorized to lease "any bottom of the waters
of the state in a natural oyster bed or reef" to any Alabama citizen or corporation.
In addition, Alabama has recognized the right of persons who own lands fronting
waters where oysters may be grown to plant and gather them to a distance of 600
yards from the shore. The rights appurtenant to ownership of waterfront property
have been recognized as property rights to which the incidents of ownership attach
and which may be assigned, transferred, or leased. Thus, because of the relative
immobility of oysters and the ability of the landowner to retain more than nominal
dominion over them, the oysterman holds the sort of protected property right
which is necessary for the assertion of a claim for private relief.
Comment, Oil and Oysters Don't Mix: Private Remedies for Pollution Damage to Shellfish,
23 AlA. L. REv. 100, 103 (1970) (citations omitted); accord, Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d
257 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Doucet v. Texas Co., 205 La. 312, 17 So. 2d 340 (1944).
19. Ragland v. Clarson, 259 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Hughett v. Caldwell
County, 313 Ky. 85, 230 S.W.2d 921 (1950); Harrison v. Petroleum Surveys, Inc., 80 So. 2d
153 (La. 1955); Academy of Dance Arts, Inc. v. Bates, 1 N.C. App. 133, 161 S.E.2d 762
(1968). Damages which are the immediate consequence of the trespass may be awarded
for inconvenience, for injury to health or to business. 87 C.J.S., Trespass § 108 (1954).
20. See Cauley v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Schubowsky v.
Hearn Food Store, Inc., 247 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Continental Oil Co. v. Hinton,
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front resort owner has a better chance of recovering his loss of business
profits, as well as property damage, under either a theory of trespass or
negligence than does a nonbeachfront owner of recovering solely his loss
of business profits under negligence doctrine.2 This situation exists be-
cause in the case of the beachfront owner, loss of business profits may be
recovered as a consequence of the property damage, whereas in the case
of the nonbeachfront owner, recovery of lost profits must be based on an
action for interference with contract rights wherein intentional inter-
ference must be shown.22 The policy considerations behind this differentia-
tion are that the risk of pecuniary misfortune to nonbeachfront owners
cannot, under the law, be adequately foreseen by a negligent shipowner,
and further, the loss of intangible profits is too speculative; whereas, risk
of property damage may well be foreseen under the law.23
Where it is apparent that an oil pollution claimant will be unable to
prove that his injury is attributable to the negligent discharge of oil from
a vessel, because evidence concerning the discharge lies wholly with the
shipowner, the claimant may find it to his advantage to rely on the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. The use of this doctrine does not in any way
eliminate the problems of foreseeability that many claimants, particularly
nonbeachfront business and property owners, will have to overcome in
order to win compensation for damages such as the loss of business profits
or the reduction of nonbeachfront property value as a consequence of an
oil discharge.
C. Nuisance
An action based on nuisance theory is one which might not initially
appear appropriate to recover damages resulting from a vessel's dis-
charge of oil. The reason for this is that nuisance theory generally con-
notes a continuing or recurring interference with a claimant's use and
enjoyment of his property for an extended period of time.24 Yet this is
not a uniform requirement of every state. As case law of the various
states indicates, where harm to a claimant is instantaneous and substan-
tial, the claimant may often maintain a nuisance action for his damage.
2 1
253 Miss. 233, 175 So. 2d 512 (1965); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 366 P.2d
614 (Okla. 1961).
21. Shutler, Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 7 HOUSTON L. Rzv. 415, 435 (1970).
22. Small v. United States, 333 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1964); Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932); Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Smiley, 143 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1962).
23. Sweeney, supra note 16, at 174.
24. Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972); Smillie v.
Continental Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 508 (D. Colo. 1954).
25. E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Shreffler, 139 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1943); Ambrosini
v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 720, 317 P.2d 33 (1st Dist. 1957); "Where the
invasion affects the physical condition of the plaintiff's land, the substantial character of
the interference is seldom in doubt." Prosser, supra note 12, at 578. See In re New Jersey
Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Wiegand v. Duval-Wright Eng'r. Co., 23
Fla. Supp. 35 (1964).
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Thus, the nuisance doctrine may serve as a concept upon which compen-
sation may be sought by certain claimants whose damages are attributable
to a single discharge of oil.
The nuisance doctrine has historically taken two tracks of develop-
ment: One narrowly restricted to the invasion of an interest in the use or
enjoyment of real property, and the other extending to virtually any form
of annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public rights."
A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of private
rights in land (i.e., one's right to use and enjoy his property), and is
actionable by individual persons.2 7 A public nuisance, on the other hand,
is a type of criminal offense consisting of an interference with the rights
of the community at large; thus, its redress may be sought only by public
officials.28
Since a variety of public harms affect both public and private inter-
est, various forms of hybrid nuisance also exist. 9 When a situation of this
type arises, it is the claimant who must plead and prove that his damage
is different in kind from that of the public at large.8 0 This qualification
is the result of the uniform opinion that a private individual cannot ini-
tiate an action for the invasion of a purely public right unless his injury
can in some way be distinguished from that suffered by the general
public.3
In this respect, the pecuniary losses sustained by commercial
fisheries due to polluted waters have been held to be sufficiently distinct
from the damages sustained by the public at large, to allow compensation
for the fisheries. 2 On the other hand, where pecuniary loss is common to
an entire community or a substantial part of a community, it has been re-
garded as no different in kind from the common misfortune.83 This would
seem to preclude the possibility of nonbeachfront hotel owners, restaurant
26. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997-99 (1966).
27. Dahlstrom v. Roosevelt Mills, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp. 355, 238 A.2d 431 (Super. Ct.
1967); Cox v. Ray M. Lee Co., 100 Ga. App. 333, 111 S.E.2d 246 (Div. 1 1959); Lederman
v. Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
28. Morse v. Liquor Control Comm., 319 Mich. 52, 29 N.W.2d 316 (1947); Gibbons
v. Hoffman, 203 Misc. 26, 115 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1952); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp
Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943).
29. See Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 260 Minn. 315, 109 N.W.2d 749 (1961);
Ballenger v. City of Grand Saline, 276 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Costas v. Fond
Du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964).
30. Wade v. Campbell, 200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173 (4th Dist. 1962); Pear-
man v. Wiggins, 103 Miss. 4, 60 So. 1 (1912); Gibbons v. Hoffman, 203 Misc. 26, 115
N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27
S.E.2d 538 (1943).
31. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In Theaters, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So. 2d 537 (1956) ; Missouri
Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. Glisan, 230 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1950); Bouquet v. Hackensack
Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (1916); PROSSER, supra note 12, at 586.
32. Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., 240 Ark. 887, 402 S.W.2d 640 (1966); Hampton
v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943); Columbia River Fisher-
man's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Ore. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939).
33. Hohman v. City of Chicago, 140 Ill. 226, 29 N.E. 671 (1892); Smedberg v. Moxie
Dam Co., 148 Me. 302, 92 A.2d 606 (1952).
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owners, gas station owners, etc., from obtaining compensation for lost
profits due to a slump in tourism as a result of an oil spill's effect on local
beaches.
Beachfront owners whose property is actually invaded, however,
would undergo an injury distinct from that of the general public; thus
they should be allowed compensation. Further, as a comparatively recent
case suggests, recovery may be possible on the basis of nuisance where
beachfront property is not actually invaded, but a property owner's
littoral or riparian rights, such as fishing, swimming and boating, are
impaired by an oil discharge. 4
While a nuisance action may be a perfectly appropriate remedy for
the beachfront owner who has undergone direct invasion of his property
by oil attributable to a ship's discharge, it does not appear to be of
any value to the nonbeachfront owner in recovering lost business profits
resulting from the same spill. Furthermore, the problems a claimant
encounters in proving the origin of an oil discharge, and either intent or
negligence, must still be surmounted.
IV. INADEQUACIES IN ACTIONS BASED ON TRADITIONAL
CONCEPTS OF TORT LIABILITY
Examination of the common law concepts of tort liability from the
claimant's standpoint reveals that there are numerous pitfalls and inade-
quacies in the actions he may bring based upon these concepts for the
damage he has suffered as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil on navi-
gable waters. To begin with, under these age old theories, a shipowner will
not be liable to private parties for damage wrought when a vessel en-
counters an extraordinary peril which results in a non-deliberate and
non-negligent discharge of oil or petroleum products. Even when this
is not the case, the claimant will still have the burden of proving that the
discharge which caused his injury was either intentionally or negligently
caused and this burden may be particularly onerous considering the
complex nature of maritime enterprise and activity.
More importantly perhaps, under the Federal Limitation of Liability
Act," the liability of the owner of any vessel for damage resulting from
the operation of such vessel occasioned without "the privity or knowl-
edge" of the owner may be limited to the "value of the interest of such
owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending."3 " The United States
Supreme Court has held that the value of an owner's interest in a vessel
and its pending freight is to be determined at the termination of each
voyage. 7 Thus, if the aggregate amount of the various pollution claims
34. In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
35. 46 U.S.C. § 181-96 (1970).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970). For a detailed discussion of the phrase "privity or knowl-
edge" consult GILMoRE, suPra note 5, at §§ 10-20, 10-24.
37. City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
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that result from a vessel's discharge of oil exceed the value of the vessel,
and limitation of liability is allowed, many claimants may receive only
partial compensation for their damage. Moreover, if a vessel in the process
of discharging oil sinks, or is so completely destroyed as to be worthless,
or nearly so, and the owner is allowed to limit his liability, pollution
claimants may be left without any hope of compensation. 8
V. COMPENSATION BASED UPON MARITIME CONCEPTS
OF LIABILITY
As a novel approach to the problem of private compensation, it has
been suggested that the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness be utilized
in an effort to recoup damages occasioned by a vessel's discharge of oil. 9
Theoretically, it is argued that if a claimant's injury is the consequence
of a discharge which resulted from some defect in a vessel or its equip-
ment, then the vessel owner might be held liable for the claimant's damage
under principles of unseaworthiness. Moreover, as this doctrine is pred-
icated on strict liability, a vessel owner could avoid liability only by
proving that the defect which produced the oil pollution was itself occa-
sioned by an act which would amount to a defense under strict liability
principles, such as an act of God or war.4"
Historically, however, the doctrine of unseaworthiness has applied
only to seamen and longshoremen who have suffered personal injury, 1
or cargo owners who have sustained cargo losses 42 as a result of an unsea-
worthy vessel.43
Until very recently, no American cases existed dealing with the em-
ployment of the doctrine in oil discharge situations, although an English
court had suggested its applicability."4 In the 1972 case of Maryland
v. Amerada Hess Corp.,45 it was held that the doctrine of unseaworthiness
was not available to the State of Maryland to recover for damages to the
waters of Baltimore Harbor resulting from the rupture of an oil transfer
line between a tanker and a storage facility. The court relied on the fact
that traditionally, the doctrine has been limited to privity of contract
38. For an example of the limitation provision in an oil discharge case, see In re New
Jersey Barging Corp., 144 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
39. Sweeney, supra note 16, at 167-69.
40. Id. at 167.
41. The absolute duty of ship owners to provide a seaworthy vessel to seamen was
established by the Supreme Court in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) and was extended to
longshoremen and maritime workers performing the historical functions of seamen in Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
42. Application of unseaworthiness principles in connection with cargo can be seen in
provisions of both the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1970) and the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1300 et seq. (1970).
43. See generally GimoRE, supra note 5, at §§ 3-22, 3-35, 6-1, 6-64; McCoy, Oil Spill
and Pollution Control: The Conflict Between State and Maritime Law, 40 GEo. WASr. L.
Rv. 97, 108 (1971).
44. Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp., [19561 A.C. 218 (1955).
45. 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
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situations or has run to the benefit of those performing the historical
functions of seamen. It refused to extend the absolute duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel for the benefit of the State of Maryland, indicating that
the relationship between the state and the defendant tanker corporation
did not entail the type of hazards that would necessitate imposing such
a duty.40
Certainly, conservationists and ecologists might take issue with the
decision, and perhaps if they can demonstrate the gravity of the states'
need for such protection, future decisions may allow such a claim. Like-
wise, the courts may look more sympathetically upon those private parties
who undergo substantial injury as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil;
yet, it appears that utilization of the doctrine of unseaworthiness will not
prove a facile avenue to recovery if, in fact, it is not a dead end street.
VI. PRESENT NON-AVAILABILITY OF RELIEF UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
On the international level, no convention presently ratified by the
United States explicitly provides for recovery by private persons of dam-
ages resulting from the discharge of oil from vessels. However, the Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969
and the International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 1971, both
offer such a possibility.47 The United States has signed both of these
Conventions but, as yet, has ratified neither.
The Liability Convention deals with the civil liability of shipowners
to both governments and private persons. Owners of seagoing craft regis-
tered in or flying the flag of a contracting state and actually carrying oil
in bulk as cargo may be liable for damages caused in the territory or
territorial sea of contracting states by the escape or discharge of per-
sistent oils.48 Thus, while the Liability Convention covers tankers and
dry cargo vessels carrying oil as cargo in a deep tank or other compart-
ment, it does not apply to large segments of the shipping industry, such
as passenger shipping.
Article III of the Liability Convention provides that the owner of
a vessel falling under scrutiny of the Convention, shall be liable for any
pollution damage caused by oil which escapes or is discharged from the
ship except that no liability for pollution damage shall attach to the
owner if he proves that the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrec-
46. Id. at 1070-71.
47. The Conventions are hereinafter referred to, and cited respectively, as the Liability
Convention and the Fund Convention. The text of the Liability Convention may be found
at 1 J. MAR. L. & Comm. 373 (1970). For the text of the Fund Convention, see 3 J. MA.
L. & Comm. 624 (1972).
48. Liability Convention art. I-V, supra note 47.
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tion or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent
to cause damage by a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act
of any Government or other authority responsible for the main-
tenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of
that function. 9
Additionally, if the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted
wholly or partially from an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage by the person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of
that person, the owner may be exonerated wholly or partially from his
liability to such person. 50
All liability under the Liability Convention would be channeled
through the registered owner of the discharging vessel, but there would
be a right of recourse reserved to the owner of such vessel against third
parties. 1 The liability of the shipowner would be limited to 2,000 Poin-
care francs (approximately $170) per gross ton or a total of 210 million
Poincare francs (approximately $18 million) for a single incident, which-
ever would be less, unless the pollution was the result of the owner's so-
called "actual fault or privity," i.e., his personal fault, as distinguished
from the fault of the master or the crew imputed to him under the re-
spondeat superior doctrine.52 Yet, if the spill resulted from the owner's
personal fault or privity, he would be liable without limit. 8
For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of the limitation
of liability discussed above, the Liability Convention provides that the
shipowner need only constitute a fund for the total sum representing the
limit of his liability in any one of the states experiencing pollution dam-
age.Y Yet, the courts of any contracting state in which pollution occurred
would have jurisdiction to hear and determine both governmental and
private claims. 5 However, only the courts of the state in which the fund
was constituted would have competence to determine matters relating
to the apportionment and distribution of the fund; 56 but, any judgment
obtained from a court with proper jurisdiction in the state where the
pollution occurred and which would be enforceable in that state would
be recognized by the contracting state holding the fund, unless the judg-
49. Id. art. III.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. art. V.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. IX.
56. Id.
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ment was obtained by fraud, or the defendant was not given reasonable
notice and a fair opportunity to present his case.57
Each ship covered by the Liability Convention is required to main-
tain proof of its owner's financial responsibility by carrying a certificate
attesting that insurance or other financial security is in force." The Liabil-
ity Convention further provides for direct actions against the insurer
or guarantor, but preserves to him whatever defenses (other than the
bankruptcy or winding up of the owner) which the owner himself would
have been entitled to invoke if the action f6 r pollution damage had been
brought against the owner rather than the insurer.5 9 It also provides that
the traditional defense of willful misconduct is preserved for the insurer.60
The Fund Convention is designed to supplement the Liability Con-
vention by expanding the scope of compensable oil discharges and by
making more money available to claimants (i.e., governments and private
persons) with respect to oil discharges thereby covered."' Moreover, the
Convention does all this while at the same time reducing the shipowners
personal financial burden under the Liability Convention. 2
There is one exception to the generality that the Fund Convention
supplements the Liability Convention: the Fund Convention will not
supplement the Liability Convention in respect to damage resulting from
the discharge of animal and vegetable oils. For, under the Liability Con-
vention, "oil" is defined as "any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil,
heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and whale oil ' whereas under the Fund
Convention, the definition of "oil" is confined to any "persistent hydro-
carbon mineral oils."
'64
The Fund Convention would establish a "fund" of approximately
thirty six million dollars composed mainly of revenues derived from con-
tributions computed on the basis of a fee on the amount of oil carried by
sea to the various contracting states. 5 The Fund would then be used
to pay compensation to any person suffering damage as a result of a dis-
charge of any persistent hydro-carbon mineral oil, if that person is unable
to obtain full and adequate compensation for the damage under the terms
of the Liability Convention,
(a) because no liability for the damage arises under the Lia-
bility Convention;
57. Id. art. X.
58. Id. art. VII.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. For a discussion of this supplemental aspect of the Fund Convention see Doud,
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Further Comment on the Civil Liability and Com-
pensation Fund Conventions, 4 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 525 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Doud].
62. Fund Convention art. V, supra note 47.
63. Liability Convention art. I, supra note 47.
64. Fund Convention art. II, supra note 47.
65. Id. art. IV, X.
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(b) because the owner liable for the damage under the Liabil-
ity Convention is financially incapable of meeting his obligations
in full and any financial security that may be provided under
Article VII of that Convention does not cover or is insufficient
to satisfy the claims for compensation for the damage; an owner
being treated as financially incapable of meeting his obligations
and a financial security being treated as insufficient if the per-
son suffering the damage has been unable to obtain full satis-
faction of the amount of compensation due under the Liability
Convention after having taken all reasonable steps to pursue
the legal remedies available to him; or
(c) because the damage exceeds the owner's liability under the
Liability Convention as limited pursuant to Article V, paragraph
1, of that Convention or under the terms of any other interna-
tional Convention in force or open for signature, ratification or
accession at the date of this Convention.6
6
However, the Fund would incur no obligation under the preceding
paragraph if:
(a) it [is proven] that the pollution damage resulted from an
act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or was caused by
oil which has escaped or been discharged from a warship or
other ship owned or operated by a State and used, at the time
of the incident, only on Government noncommercial service; or
(b) the claimant cannot prove that the damage resulted from
an incident involving one or more ships.6
Thus, the only defenses retained by the Fund, once there is proof that
the damage was caused by a ship carrying bulk oil as cargo, are that the
incident was caused by an act of war or other hostilities or that the ship
discharging the oil was a government owned noncommercial vessel.
While it is true that neither of these Conventions has yet been rati-
fied by the United States, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
reported the Liability Convention to the floor of the Senate with the rec-
ommendation that advice and consent to ratification be given but with
the proviso that the Senate should not take final action until it also acts
on the Fund Convention.68 It remains but a matter of speculation then,
as to if or when these Conventions will be ratified by the United States.
Even if these Conventions were to be ratified, however, they would not
provide the blanket protection that is needed to cover all types of oil dis-
charges since they deal only with discharges of oil from vessels shipping
oil in bulk as cargo.
66. Id. art. IV.
67. Id.
68. Doud, supra note 61, at 525.
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VII. NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPENSATION UNDER FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
The primary thrust of the Federal Government's involvement with
the discharge of oil from vessels on the navigable waters of the United
States has been to attempt to prohibit discharges under provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.69 This act does not, however, pro-
vide for private relief when a spill does take place. Rather, it merely at-
tempts to control oil pollution by deterring it or providing for its abate-
ment once it has occurred. Obviously, neither of these approaches help
to compensate the pollution victim for the damage he suffers in the inter-
val between an actual oil discharge and its subsequent removal.
The Act as amended in 1972 prohibits the discharge of oil by ves-
sels7" into or upon the navigable waters of the United States or the waters
of the contiguous zone except when permitted either by the 1954 Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil"' or
by Presidential Regulation. s Knowingly discharging oil into or upon such
waters in violation of the Act is punishable by civil penalty of not more
than $5,00071 and failure by any person in charge of a vessel from which
oil is discharged to notify the appropriate governmental agency of a pro-
hibited discharge is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and one year
imprisonment.74
The federal law further provides that when oil is discharged into or
upon the navigable waters or shorelines of the United States or into the
waters of the contiguous zone, the President is authorized to have the oil
removed unless he determines that removal will be properly undertaken
by the owner or operator of the offending vessel. 5
Where the United States Government does proceed with cleanup
operations, the owner or operator will be liable to the Government for the
actual cost incurred for the removal of the oil. There will be no liability
to the United States Government, however, where the owner or operator
of the vessel can prove that the discharge was caused solely by (a) an act
of God, (b) an act of war, (c) negligence on the part of the United States
69. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1974).
70. The term "vessel" as used in the statute means "every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water other than a public vessel," and the term "public vessel" means "a vessel owned
or bareboat-chartered and operated by the United States, or by a State or political sub-
division thereof, or by a foreign nation, except when such vessel is engaged in commerce."
33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(a) (1974).
71. International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil of
1954. The 1954 text as ratified by the United States in 1961 appears at [1961] 12 U.S.T.
2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900. The 1962 amendments as ratified by the United States in 1966
appear at [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109.
72. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(3) (Supp. 1974).
73. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b) (6) (Supp. 1974).
74. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(5) (Supp. 1974).
75. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(c)(1) (Supp. 1974).
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Government, or (d) an act or omission of a third party without regard to
whether any such act or omission was or was not negligent, or any com-
bination of the foregoing causes. The total liability may not exceed $100
per gross ton of the vessel or $14,000,000, whichever is less, except where
the United States can show that the discharge was the result of willful
negligence or willful misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the
owner. If this occurs, such owner or operator is liable to the United States
for the full amount of the cleanup costs. Finally, costs may be assessed
against the owner or operator in an in personam action or against the ves-
sel in an in rem action. 7
To aid the prospects of governmental recovery, the Act provides
that:
Any vessel over three hundred gross tons, including any
barge of equivalent size, but not including any barge that is not
self-propelled and that does not carry oil or hazardous sub-
stances as cargo or fuel, using any port or place in the United
States or the navigable waters of the United States for any pur-
pose shall establish and maintain under regulations to be pre-
scribed from time to time by the President, evidence of financial
responsibility of $100 per gross ton, or $14,000,000 whichever
is the lesser, to meet the liability to the United States which such
vessel could be subjected under this section. In cases where an
owner or operator owns, operates, or charters more than one
such vessel, financial responsibility need only be established to
meet the maximum liability to which the largest of such vessels
could be subjected. 7
With regard to private rights, the Act explicitly provides that it shall not
affect or modify in any way the liability of any shipowner or operator to
any person or agency under any provision of law for damages to any
publicly-owned or privately-owned property resulting from a discharge
of any oil or from the removal of that oil. 78 Therefore, while the deter-
rent-abatement effect of the Act is clear, it is equally clear that the Act
will be of no benefit to private parties in attempting to recover compen-
sation for the damages they undergo as a result of a vessel's discharge of
oil on the navigable waters of the United States.
VIII. AVAILABILITY OF COMPENSATION UNDER STATE STATUTES
While the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 79 does not itself pro-
vide a means by which private parties may be compensated for the in-
juries they receive as a result of vessel oil discharges, it does allow the
states to provide such relief by declaring in section (o) that:
76. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(f) (Supp. 1974).
77. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(p)(1) (Supp. 1974).
78. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(o)(1) (Supp. 1974).
79. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1974).
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(1) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any
way the obligations of any owner or operator of any vessel,
or of any owner or operator of any onshore facility or off-
shore facility to any person or agency under any provision
of law for damages to any publicly owned or privately
owned property resulting from a discharge of any oil or
hazardous substance or from the removal of any such oil
or hazardous substance.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing
any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge
of oil or hazardous substance into any waters within such
State.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting or
modifying any other existing authority of any Federal de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality, relative to onshore
or offshore facilities under this chapter or any other pro-
vision of law, or to affect any State or local law not in con-
flict with this section. 0
In this regard, several states have enacted anti-pollution legislation
which may be advantageous to the claimant seeking to recover for the
damage he sustains as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil on the navi-
gable waters of the United States, where these waters are concurrently
under the jurisdiction of a particular state. To date, on the basis of this
existing state legislation, a claimant may seek compensation, depending
on the statute under which he is attempting to proceed, in one of three
ways: (1) by proceeding according to the administrative or arbitral pro-
cedure provided for in a given statute; (2) by initiating a civil action
on the basis of a private right explicitly provided for in a given statute;
or (3) by initiating a civil action on the basis of a private right implied
by a given statute.
In 1970, the State of Maine enacted a precedential statute dealing
with oil pollution and the coastal conveyance of petroleum."' This statute
established a "non-lapsing, revolving fund" limited to four million
dollars.8" Its initial funding is derived primarily from an annual license
fee of one-half cent per barrel of petroleum products transferred over
water during the licensing period. 3 The license fee is imposed on "oil
terminal facilities" which include shore facilities used for the offloading
or onloading of petroleum products and certain vessels involved in vessel-
to-vessel transfers of petroleum products taking place within the 12 mile
80. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(o) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
81. Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1970, ME. REv. STAT. Am.
tit. 38, §§ 541-57 (Supp. 1973).
82. Id. § 551.
83. Id.
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limit established by the statute.84 When the four million dollar limit is
attained, the license fee drops to a level sufficient to meet the continuing
administrative expenses, unreimbursed charges,85 and the cost of au-
thorized research and development. s6
A state commission administers the fund,8 7 out of which a claimant
may seek compensation for oil pollution by proceeding according to arbi-
tration procedures provided for in the statute.88 The statute also provides
that determinations made by a majority of a three member board of
arbitration shall be final, and such determinations may be subject to
judicial review only as to matters relating to abuse of discretion of the
board.89
Maine's approach to the problem of providing compensation to
persons suffering damage as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil is an
entirely new one. Yet from the claimant's standpoint, it is a most ade-
quate one, for not only are the damages that can be recovered under the
new statute extremely comprehensive, but also the claimant can be
compensated for his injury within a minimal period of time. Moreover,
because compensation is not sought in a forum in which substantive mari-
time law is applicable, the Federal Limitation of Liability Act,90 will not
affect any award given to the claimant by the arbitral panel. In fact, the
claimant is guaranteed full compensation despite the financial status of
84. Id. § 542(7).
85. Cleanup expenses for which the Fund will not be reimbursed include: (1) "mystery
spills where it is impossible to assign liability"; (2) the first $15,000 expended to clean up
a spill "promptly reported" by a licensee; and (3) costs associated with a spill for which
reimbursement is waived. Id. § 551.
86. Id.
87. Id. §§ 543, 546, 551.
88. Third party damages. Any person claiming to have suffered damages to real
estate or personal property or loss of income directly or indirectly as a result of
a [prohibited] discharge of oil, petroleum products or their by-products . . . may
apply within 6 months after the occurrence of such a discharge to the commission
stating the amount of damage he claims to have suffered as a result of such dis-
charge ...
A. If the claimant, the board and the person causing the discharge can agree
to the damage claim, the board shall certify the amount of the claim and the
name of the claimant to the Treasurer of State and the Treasurer of State shall
pay the same from the Maine Coastal Petroleum Fund.
B. If the claimant, the commission and the person causing the discharge
cannot agree as to the amount of the damage claim, the claim shall forthwith
be transmitted for action to the Board of Arbitration as provided in this
subchapter.
C. Third party damage claims shall be stated in their entirety in one applica-
tion. Damages omitted from any claim at the time the award is made shall
be deemed waived.
D. Damage claims arising under the provisions of this subchapter shall be
recoverable only in the manner provided under this subchapter, it being the
intent of the Legislature that the remedies provided in this subchapter are
exclusive.
Id. § 551(2).
89. Id. § 551(3).
90. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970).
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the owner of the vessel which caused the claimant's damage, or the
condition or value of the vessel itself.
A second method by which a private party may seek compensation
for oil pollution damage on the basis of a state anti-pollution statute, can
be illustrated by examining a recently enacted Washington statute'
which, among other things, provides:
Any person owning oil or having control over oil which enters
the waters of the state in an unexcused manner shall be strictly
liable, without regard to fault, for the damages to persons, or
property, public or private, caused by such an entry. In an action
to recover such damages, said person shall be relieved from
strict liability, without regard to fault, if he can prove that oil
to which the damages relate entered the waters of the state (as
a result of: a) an act of war or sabotage, or b) negligence on
the part of the United States government, or the State of Wash-
ington) 92
From this provision, it is clear that a claimant in the State of Washington
has an explicit private right upon which he may institute a civil action
for the damage he suffers as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil within
the state's waters. Furthermore, the strict liability placed by the statute
upon persons having control over oil will aid the claimant in recovering
compensation for his injury by reducing his burden of proof.
Massachusetts has also created by statute a new, private cause of
action which may benefit some of the residents of that commonwealth
who incur damage as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil. 3 The statute
provides that all persons responsible for any spillage, seepage, or other
discharge of oil into any waters of the commonwealth or into any offshore
waters which may result in damage to the waters, shores or natural re-
sources utilized or enjoyed by citizens of the commonwealth, and all per-
sons who owned or controlled the oil, or who owned, controlled or leased
the vessel, tank, pipe, hose or other container in which the oil was located
when the spillage, seepage or discharge occurred, shall be jointly and
severally liable to any other person for any damage to his real or personal
property. 4 Unfortunately, however, this statute is not as pervasive as
the Washington statute, for it provides assistance only to those suffering
actual physical damage to real or personal property, and it is unclear
whether a strict liability standard is to be applied in private civil actions.
Perhaps more important to a particular claimant, however, is the fact
that he might be precluded from complete recovery due to the applicabil-
91. Washington Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.48.315-.336
(Supp. 1973).
92. Id. § 90.48.336.
93. Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, MAss. GEx. LAws ANw. ch. 21, § 27 (1973).
94. Id.
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ity of the Federal Limitation of Liability Act95 to the particular circum-
stances of his injuryf 6
The third method by which a claimant may seek compensation on
the basis of state anti-pollution statutes can be illustrated by the Michi-
gan Water Pollution Control Act of 1970. 97 The Michigan legislation
does not explicitly provide a private right for the oil pollution claimant.
Yet, because the statute does not specifically declare that the legal rights
arising from it rest solely with the state, it is possible that an oil pollution
claimant may be able to seek recovery on the basis of a private right im-
plied under the statute.
Basically, the implied cause of action theory suggests that the courts
could provide the desired private relief by creating a new cause of action,
not based on traditional common law, by using the prohibitions of the
state regulatory statute as the standard of liability. The creation of this
new cause of action would, unfortunately, require certain judicial deter-
minations relating to venue, periods of limitation, various defenses and
other factors which would be an arduous task to undertake. Hence, it
appears unlikely that pollution claimants will find this theory a simple
one to utilize.
However, two alternatives to creating a totally new implied cause
of action from state regulatory statutes exist which may assist the
claimant. The first approach suggests that the courts utilize the state
pollution statute to conclusively set the standard of conduct required in
a common law action. If this theory were accepted, the oil pollution
claimant could bring, for example, a common law negligence action and
rely upon the defendant's violation of the statute to establish by negli-
gence per se the defendant's breach of duty, one of the essential elements
of the action. In order to recover, the claimant would still be required to
prove each of the other elements of the action, such as proximate cause.
Similarly, the pollution claimant could utilize this theory in a common-law
private nuisance action by relying upon the statute's violation to estab-
lish the existence of a nuisance. However, proof of the remaining ele-
ments of a nuisance action, such as special injury, would be required.
95. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970).
96. See discussion of the Federal Limitation of Liability Act section V supra.
97. (1) A person owning, operating or otherwise concerned in the operation, navi-
gation or management of a watercraft operating on the waters of this state shall
not discharge or permit the discharge of oil or oily wastes from the watercraft
into or onto the waters of this state if the oil or oily wastes threaten to pollute or
contribute to the pollution of the waters or adjoining shorelines or beaches.
(2) The owner or operator of any watercraft who, whether directly or through any
person concerned in the operation, navigation or management of the watercraft,
discharges or permits or causes or contributes to the discharge of oil or oily wastes
into or onto the waters of this state or adjoining shorelines or beaches shall im-
mediately remove the oil or oily wastes from the waters, shorelines or beaches. If
the state removes the oil or oily wastes which were discharged by an owner or
operator, the watercraft and the owner or operator are liable to the state for the
full amount of the costs reasonably incurred for its removal. The state may bring
action against the owner or operator to recover such costs in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction.
MIcH. Comtsp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201-07 (1970).
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The second alternative, which may be designated as the evidentiary
theory, reasons that breach of the state statute provides only evidence,
not conclusive proof, to aid the claimant in establishing the standard of
conduct required in a common law action."8 Again, however, just as in
the case of a claimant who is able to bring suit on the basis of a statute
explicitly providing for a private cause of action, the claimant who relies
on implied cause of action principles to bring his suit may be precluded
from complete recovery by virtue of the Federal Limitation of Liability
Act.90
IX. RECENT CASES CONSTRUING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATE OIL DISCHARGE STATUTES
The foregoing discussion of various new state oil spill statutes
demonstrates the concern of many states and their residents for obtaining
compensation for damage resulting from oil discharges. Since the adop-
tion of these statutes, however, a number of questions relating to their
constitutionality have arisen. The Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1970100 can be cited to illustrate many of these
concerns.
The Florida Act imposes upon the owners or operators of any ter-
minal facility or waterfront facility used for drilling for oil or handling
the transfer or storage of oil, their agents or servants and any vessel des-
tined for or leaving such facility, absolute and unlimited liability for any
damage incurred by the state or private persons as a result of an oil
spill in Florida waters.1 ' Moreover, each owner or operator of a terminal
facility or ship subject to liability under the Florida Act must establish
evidence of financial responsibility in an amount satisfactory to the state
98. Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAav. L. REv.
285, 286 (1963).
99. 46 U.S.C. § 181-96 (1970). See discussion of effect of the Act, section V supra.
i00. FLA. STAT. §§ 376.011-21 (1973).
101. FLA. STAT. § 376.12 (1973). This section provides:
Because it is the intent of this chapter to provide the means for rapid and effective
cleanup and to minimize damages, any licensee and its agents or servants including
vessels destined for or leaving a licensee's terminal facility, who permits or suffers
a prohibited discharge or other polluting condition to take place within state
boundaries shall be liable to the state for all costs of cleanup or other damage
incurred by the state and for damages resulting from injury to others. In any suit
to enforce claims of the state under this chapter, it shall not be necessary for the
state to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner on the part of the licensee
or any vessel. If the state is damaged by a discharge prohibited by this chapter
it need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other polluting
condition and that it occurred .... (emphasis added).
Currently there exists the additional question of whether Florida can constitutionally
bring an action for the damages suffered by her residents, in light of the Supreme Court's
rulings that states may not bring parens patriae claims in a disguised attempt to recover
damages on behalf of individual citizens who are the real parties in interest. See Oklahoma
ex rel. Johnson Bank Comm'r v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S.
1 (1900). Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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by means of insurance, surety bonds, qualification as a self-insurer, or
other acceptable evidence of financial responsibility. °2
It is from this Florida Act, the Federal Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970103 (recently incorporated almost in entirety in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as amended in 1972),1 °4 and the federally
protected tenets of maritime law that the suit of Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc.'0 5 arose. In that controversy, a three judge
district court'00 held the Florida Act unconstitutional as an intrusion into
the domain of federal maritime law, but on appeal, the Supreme Court
of the United States in a unanimous decision upheld the Florida Act
stating:
We find no constitutional or statutory impediment in permitting
Florida, in the present setting of this case, to establish any 're-
quirement or liability' concerning the impact of oil spillages on
Florida's interests or concerns. To rule as the District Court
has done is to allow federal admiralty jurisdiction to swallow
most of the police power of the States over oil-spillage--an
insidious form of pollution of vast concern to every coastal city
or port and to all the estuaries on which the life of the ocean
and the lives of the coastal people are greatly dependent. 17
Initially, the Supreme Court pointed out that clearly the Federal
Water Quality Improvement Act did not preclude, but allowed state reg-
ulation in the oil discharge situations covered by the Florida Act, citing
section 1161 (o) of the Federal Act.' The Court indicated that while the
Federal Act related to the federal government's costs in cleaning up an
oil spill, the damages specified in the Florida Act related to the state's
costs for its part in cleaning up the spill and for the damages to the resi-
dents of the state resulting from the spill. These provisions the Court
pointed out are a part of an integrated whole to compensate for the total
costs of an oil discharge.10 9
In regard to the applicability of the Federal Limitation of Liability
Act" to the Florida Act, the Court stated:
So far as vessels are concerned the [F]ederal Limitation
of Liability Act, extends to damages caused by oil spills even
102. FLA. STAT. § 376.14 (1973).
103. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161 (Supp. 1974).
104. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1974).
105. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
106. American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla.
1972).
107. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1973). For
a detailed discussion of this case see 28 U. MiaI L. REV. 209 (1973).
108. Presently the provisions of section 1161(o) of the Federal Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970 are included in those of section 1321(0) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act as amended in 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1974). See note 80
supra and accompanying text.
109. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1973).
110. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970).
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where the injury is to the shore. That Act limits the liabilities
of the owners of vessels to the "value of such vessels and freight
pending." 111
Yet, stating that the questions were premature, the Court refused to
answer whether the damages the state could recover from a polluter are
limited to those specified in the Federal Act and whether, in turn, the
Federal Act removed the pre-existing limitation of liability in the Limi-
tation of Liability Act. 112 "It is sufficient," the Court said, "for this day to
hold that there is room for state action in cleaning up the waters of a
State and recouping, at least within federal limits so far as vessels are
concerned, her costs.""'
The remaining question with which the Supreme Court dealt was
whether a state constitutionally may exercise its police power respecting
maritime activities concurrently with the federal government. In answer
to this, the Court reiterated the traditional concept that a state, in the
exercise of its police power, may establish rules applicable on land and
water within its limits, even though these rules incidentally affect mari-
time affairs; provided that the state action does not contravene any acts
of Congress, nor work any prejudice to the characteristic features of the
maritime law, nor interfere with its proper harmony and uniformity in
international and interstate relations." 4
Specifically, the Court pointed out that sea-to-shore pollution, his-
torically within the range of the police power of the state, was not silently
taken away from the states by the Admiralty Extension Act 1 5 which the
Court said, does not purport to supply the exclusive remedy. 16 For, as
the Court stated:
While Congress has extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries contemplated by the Framers, it hardly follows from
the constitutionality of that extension that we must sanctify the
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of
powers traditionally within the competence of the States."x7
It is beyond question now, therefore, that states do have the right
to develop legislation to provide compensation for themselves and their
residents for damages which they suffer resulting from the discharge
of oil from vessels on the navigable waters of the United States, where
the waters are concurrently state waters. The statutory liability might
Ill. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 330 (1973) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 332. Those same questions would now be applicable to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as amended in 1972, for the provisions of the Federal Water
Quality Improvement Act which gave rise to the questions originally, have been adopted
in the 1972 Act.
113. Id. at 332.
114. Id. at 337-40.
115. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
116. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 343 (1973).
117. Id. at 341.
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perhaps be without limit where such legislation provides for procedures
against non-vessel owners (i.e., terminal facility owners and the like),
and it may extend at least to the limits of the Federal Limitation of Lia-
bility Act when the legislation provides for procedures against vessels or
vessel owners responsible for a discharge.
The Supreme Court of Maine in the recent case of Portland Pipe
Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission,118 shed addi-
tional light on the problems facing the states in providing for state and
private compensation in oil discharge situations. In that action the plain-
tiffs challenged Maine's Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control
Act"' as violating various provisions of both the United States and Maine
Constitutions; however, the Maine court upheld its constitutionality
after an exhaustive study.
In an extremely enlightening decision, the court indicated that the
license fees imposed by the Act violated neither the due process nor equal
protection guaranty of either the Maine Constitution or the United
States Constitution.1 20 Further, the court held that the fees were not pro-
hibited by the import-export clause of the United States Constitution be-
cause they were imposed upon the off-loading of oil rather than upon the
oil itself, and thus, were not a direct tax on the oil.121 Moreover, the court
held that the arbitration procedure, 122 provided for under the Maine Act
for resolving third party damage claims, did not infringe on any federal
interest, but in fact, satisfied the state's objective of providing rapid com-
pensation for individuals damaged by an oil discharge and was a proper
form of relief within the scope of the "savings clause" of the Federal
Judiciary Act.128
Finally, the Maine Court reiterated the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 4 that
Congress, by enacting the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act 25
(now incorporated almost in entirety in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act)'" did not intend to prohibit state action to control the evil
of oil pollution.2 7
118. 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973).
119. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-57 (Supp. 1973). For a more complete dis-
cussion of the Maine Act, see section VIII supra.
120. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Imp. Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1, 14-31 (Me.
1973).
121. Id. at 31-40.
122. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(2) (Supp. 1973).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970); Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Imp. Comm'n,
307 A.2d 1, 41-42 (Me. 1973).
124. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
125. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161 (Supp. 1974).
126. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1974).
127. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Imp. Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1, 43-45 (Me.
1973).
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X. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE APPROACH OF
MYRIAD STATE STATUTES
World shipping interests are expressing increasing distress over the
development of a multitude of differing state statutes relating to oil
spills. They argue that if each state can establish regulations relating to
liability and financial responsibility, or to a vessel's gear, which conflict
or differ with one another or with the federal law, the ocean carriers will
be severely hampered in their ability to conduct efficient, economical,
and logistically feasible operations. Moreover, they claim that in terms
of costs and time alone, they can neither afford nor provide the additional
administrative skill necessary to comply with the diverse state statutes,
in addition to the federal law. Thirdly, they emphasize that it is impos-
sible to procure insurance to cover absolute liability and unlimited finan-
cial responsibility as created by certain state acts. x28
The result of all this, say the carriers, is their inability to operate
in states having such severe laws as that of Florida,'29 and this, they say,
only proves detrimental to the residents of such states who depend on
ocean transportation. 30
On the other hand, while it now appears beyond question that the
states may enact legislation designed to compensate their residents for
oil spill damage, there is no guaranty that they will do so. Moreover, even
though a number of states may pass various statutes to deal with the
problem, equivalent remedies may not always be provided; thus, there
may be a disparity in the degree of compensation two claimants with
similar damages may receive merely because they reside in different
states, even though both states have statutes providing for private relief.
XI. AN ALTERNATIVE-A FEDERAL FUND TO PROVIDE
FOR TOTAL COMPENSATION
What then, can be done to enhance the availability of effective com-
pensation for victims of a vessel's discharge of oil on the navigable
waters of the United States when current statutes, conventions and inter-
pretations of maritime or common law either force them to carry an all
too onerous burden of proof or fail to provide them with a means of
compensation altogether? Moreover, what can be done to correct the
situation which presently exists, where several states have statutes re-
lating to the compensation problem, but none of them combats it in
exactly the same way so that disparities result between the rights of
128. United States Coast Guard, Legal, Economic and Technical Aspects of Liability
and Financial Responsibility as Related to Oil Pollution 4-3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Coast Guard].
129. Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 376.011-.21 (1973).
130. Coast Guard supra note 128.
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residents of various states, and, shipping interests are hard pressed to
satisfy all of the requirements?
One solution might be the establishment by the federal government
of a fund to provide compensation. A separate fund could be created for
this purpose, or the scope of the fund already established under section
311 (k) of the Water Pollution Control Act'' could be enlarged to pro-
vide the needed relief. The fund could be designed to be all encompassing
so as to provide compensation for all persons who suffer damage directly
to real estate, personal property, or income as the result of such dis-
charges.
Substantively, recovery might then be sought on the basis of one of
two concepts: private parties might be allowed to seek recovery through
procedures (perhaps arbitral) established to furnish compensation under
the fund as a sole method of recovery, or, as a somewhat less satisfactory
alternative, the fund might be fashioned to ensure compensation for
damages sustained by private parties whenever legitimate claims could
not be sustained through existing procedures.
If the latter approach were chosen, the fund could be designed to
compensate persons suffering damage as a result of a vessel's discharge
of oil if any of the following situations should arise: (1) The source of
the oil is unknown; (2) the person causing the discharge has successfully
raised the defense of either an Act of God or an act of war; (3) the
person causing the discharge has successfully raised the defense of an
act of a third party who is judgment proof, bankrupt or has satisfied only
a portion of the claim, is financially incapable of meeting his obligation,
in full, or is unknown; (4) the person causing the discharge is judgment
proof, bankrupt, has satisfied only a portion of the claim, or is financially
incapable of meeting his obligation, in full; (5) the claimant has been
barred in recovery, either in whole or in part, by the operation of a limi-
tation of liability provision as set forth in a federal statute or an inter-
national convention, or (6) the oil results from a discharge from a public
vessel, i.e., a vessel owned or bareboat chartered and operated by the
United States, or by a state or political subdivision thereof, or by a for-
eign nation, except when such vessel is engaged in commerce.
Moreover, this latter approach is not completely novel in the Com-
munity of Nations. Canada, for example, has adopted this concept in
an amendment to the Canada Shipping Act.'32 The Act provides for the
establishment of a Maritime Pollution Claims Fund, 3 which is to be
built and maintained primarily by a levy (presently 15 cents), 3 4 on
each ton of oil imported to and exported from Canada.
131. 33 U.S.C.A § 1321(k) (Supp. 1974).
132. An Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 27 (2d Supp. 1970).
133. Id. § 737.
134. Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 106, No. 4, Feb. 3, 1972, P.C. 1972-185, SPR/72-33,
Reg. 3.
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Under the Canadian Act when a claimant, whether governmental or
private, has employed his best efforts to the satisfaction of either the
Administrator of the Claims Fund or an admiralty court, depending on
the situation, in determining the identity of the polluter and recovery,
to the extent that he is able, the claimant is entitled to receive full com-
pensation from the Claims Fund in consideration for assigning his right
of action or judgment to the Claims Fund.'85
Should the United States establish a broad scope fund along the lines
of either concept, it could be maintained by revenues derived from the
importation of oil into the United States or, alternatively, from revenues
derived from other sources. If an impost were placed on oil entering
the United States, the price of oil could be increased slightly to reflect
this additional cost. In this manner, the American public, which in fact
is the beneficiary of the transportation of oil, would properly purchase it
at a cost reflecting its true price, i.e., one that includes the costs of in-
juries that others may suffer as a result of its carriage prior to use.
Money expended from the fund to compensate private persons for
the damage they sustain as a result of a vessel's discharge of oil could
perhaps be repaid to the fund whenever the United States is able to ob-
tain recovery from the responsible vessel owner. Recovery could be
sought on a basis similar to the recovery of costs incurred by the federal
government in the removal of discharged oil presently provided for in
section 311 (f) of the Water Pollution Control Act.13 Hence, only money
expended from the fund for non-recoverable damages would have to be
provided from revenue derived from the impost or alternative sources.
Furthermore, the establishment of such a fund, particularly if it
were developed along the lines of the first alternative so that it provided
the sole method of recovery, might make it practical for the federal gov-
ernment to preempt the field of liability for oil pollution resulting from
the discharge of oil from vessels on the navigable waters of the United
States. This action would eliminate the burden of multiple state regula-
tions on the subject, thus helping to keep the costs of transporting oil at
the lowest possible level.
Additionally, should the proposed International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969, and the International Con-
vention in the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage of 1971,187 become ratified by the United
States and otherwise go into effect, the fund's structure could be designed
to supplement these Conventions, thus eliminating some of their short-
comings. 18 For example, it could include compensation for damage re-
135. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 27, §§ 744-45 (2d Supp. 1970).
136. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(k) (Supp. 1974).
137. See note 47 supra.
138. Doud, supra note 61, at 531.
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sulting from all forms of oil pollution, not just persistent hydrocarbon
mineral oil, and could provide for compensation in excess of the present
limits of those conventions.
More importantly, however, the institution of such a fund would
provide an adequate means by which private persons could be compen-
sated for the damages they suffer as a result of the discharge of oil from
vessels on the navigable waters of the United States.
